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ABSTRACT 
 Initially published estimates of the personal saving rate from 1965 Q3 to 1999 Q2, which 
averaged 5.3 percent, have been revised up 2.8 percentage points to 8.1 percent, as we 
document.  We show that much of the initial variations in personal saving rate across 
time was meaningless noise. Nominal disposable personal income has been revised 
upward an average of 8.4 percent: one dollar in twelve was originally missing!  We use 
both conventional and real-time estimates of the personal saving rate to forecast real 
disposable income, gross domestic product, and personal consumption and show that the 
personal saving rate in real-time almost invariably makes forecasts worse.  Thus while 
the personal saving rate may have some forecasting power once we know the true saving 
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I. Introduction 
  Do we know what the current U.S. personal saving rate is, in practice? The 
personal saving rate is a small difference between two large aggregates – personal outlays 
and disposable personal income – that are initially measured largely independently and 
with considerable noise.  Is the U.S. personal saving rate informative about future income 
or expenditure growth?  If it is mean-reverting, for example, a low personal saving rate 
should imply that future income will rise faster than consumption.  Moreover, if 
consumption obeys the permanent income hypothesis, then as Campbell (1987) has 
argued, a low personal saving rate implies that real labor income is expected to 
accelerate.  However, the personal saving rate is difficult to measure.  In this article, we 
argue that as a practical matter, noise in the U.S. personal saving rate makes it 
uninformative for forecasting purposes. 
Economists have worried about how well personal saving is measured at least 
since Taubman (1968).  Revisions to the U.S. personal saving rate have been large and 
positive in the past four decades.  Initially published estimates of the personal saving rate 
from 1965 Q3 to 1999 Q2 have been revised upward from 5.3 percent to 8.1 percent, as 
we document.  Most of these revisions are due to the benchmark revisions that follow 
economic censuses, with large revisions decades after the initial estimate. These result 
primarily from large upward revisions to both disposable personal income and personal 
outlays. Nominal disposable personal income has been revised as much as 14.8 percent 
and on average from 1965 Q3 to 1999 Q2, 8.4 percent.   
  2Benchmark revisions substantially change the relative ranking of saving rates for 
individual quarters and five-year averages.  For example, the early 1980s is now viewed 
as the period with the highest saving rates in the postwar period; yet at the time it 
appeared to have some of the lowest saving rates since the Korean War. As we shall 
show, the usefulness of the personal saving rate in predicting future movements in real 
income described by Ireland (1995) vanishes when real-time data is used.   
We assume throughout (and believe) that the revised data bring us closer to the 
true state of affairs that economic agents confront. Thus, we do not argue that the tests of 
the permanent income hypothesis carried out by Campbell and Ireland are invalid; for 
evaluating the quantitative validity of a hypothesis about economic behavior, revised data 
are generally preferable.  Rather, we argue that to test the practical value of an economic 
relationship for forecasting the n-step-ahead test based on real-time data should be 
preferred. 
We briefly review our dataset and the process the U.S. Bureau of Economic 
Analysis (BEA) uses to revise national accounts data, and show that the major changes to 
the personal saving have occurred in benchmark revisions. We show how the personal 
saving rate and disposable income have changed over successive revisions, and discuss 
some of the sources of the revisions.  Finally, we use both conventional and real-time 
estimates of the personal saving rate to forecast real disposable income, gross domestic 
product, and personal consumption.  We show that adding the personal saving rate to 
univariate AR models in real-time almost invariably makes the forecasts worse. 
 
 
  3II. Real-time data and revisions to the personal saving rate  
  The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia maintains a real-time data set for 
macroeconomists that consists of vintage snapshots of data as they were reported in the 
middle of each quarter from 1965 Q3 to the present; it is documented in Croushore and 
Stark (2001) and on-line at http://www.phil.frb.org/econ/forecast/reaindex.html. 
  The personal saving rate is personal saving as a percentage of disposable (after-
tax) personal income.  Personal saving, in turn, is disposable personal income less 
personal outlays. Disposable personal income includes wages and salary income and 
benefits, proprietors’ and rental income, dividend and interest income, and transfer 
payments such as social security benefits, less contributions to social insurance and taxes. 
As such, it represents the income of households, nonprofits, and noncorporate businesses. 
Some of these items are easily measured, such as social insurance benefits and 
contributions, but other benefits and transfers are subject to measurement and conceptual 
problems.  Wages and proprietors’ income are subject to underreporting in government 
records as a result of tax evasion. Benefits and transfers are subject to conceptual as well 
as measurement issues.  And rental income and proprietors’ income require measurement 
of deduction that are hard to define and measure well. 
  Capital gains on equity (other than from qualified equity stock options) and real 
estate are not included in personal income.  Maki and Palumbo (2001) have shown that 
the decline in the saving rate in the 1990s can be largely attributed to a fall in the saving 
rate for the highest income quintile, whose wealth-to-income ratio rose at the same time, 
presumably as a result of capital gains. Thus personal income may be understated to the 
extent that the value of equity holdings appears as (uncounted) capital gains rather than 
  4(counted) dividends, and to the extent that the rental return to property ownership omits 
the capital gains from rising house prices.
1  
  Personal outlays are personal consumption expenditures (95 percent of personal 
outlays) plus transfers and nonmortgage interest payments. 
  The data revision process. The BEA revises the national income accounts as 
follows. Data on a given quarter’s economic activity are first published in an advance 
estimate, late in the first month of the next quarter.
2 The data available at this time is 
recorded in the Philadelphia Fed’s real-time data set as the vintage of that quarter. The 
revised estimate is published in the second month of a quarter followed a month later by a 
final estimate.  These data are then generally left unchanged until the following summer, 
when the latest three years of national account data are revised.
3  A set of initial estimates 
thus undergoes three summer revisions.  Thereafter, the estimates are only changed in 
what are called benchmark revisions, which now occur every four years. The average 
personal saving rate from 1965 Q3 to 1999 Q2 was 5.3 percent when first observed in the 
advance estimates (Figure 1); in the 2005Q1 vintage it averages 8.1 percent.  Thus the 
personal saving rate over time has been revised systematically upward. 
  Where in the revision process did the upward revisions occur?  In benchmark 
revisions.  As Figure 2 shows, the pre-benchmark revisions – revisions that occur 
between the advance estimate and the last vintage before any benchmark revision -- have 
                                                 
1 Rental income, including implied income from owner-occupied housing, in 2004 was $166 billion.  This 
is a paltry 1.2 percent nominal return on net equity of housing (for households, nonprofits, and nonfarm, 
noncorporate businesses) of $13.7 trillion.  Over the entire period from 1965 to 2004, according to latest 
vintage information, the average nominal return was 1.5 percent.  By comparison, for the same period the 
return to the 12 month constant maturity Treasury 6.6 precent.   
2 Until 1985, the BEA also published a “flash” GDP estimate 15 days before the end of a quarter, but this 
estimate only included aggregate nominal and real GDP, without any underlying detail (although some 
detail was circulated internally within the government), and did not include the personal saving rate. 
3 One change in the routine has been that wages and salaries, since 2002 Q3, are revised again 3 months 
after the final estimate. 
  5been relatively unbiased and small, with the mean rise 0.06 percentage point and a mean 
squared revision of 1.13 percentage points.
4  By contrast,  the revisions from advance 
estimates to the latest vintage (the data published in 2005 Q1)  have a mean of 2.44 
percentage points and a mean squared revision of 9.75 percentage points. The benchmark 
revisions thus account for very nearly all of the bias and the bulk of the mean squared 
revision.   
  The revisions in the first three years after the data are first published are primarily 
from regular sources whose availability is delayed. Systematic biases related to these data 
can be estimated and eliminated, and BEA apparently has done so.  Benchmark revisions, 
on the other hand, incorporate two basic types of changes: statistical changes, based on 
newly available data, and definitional changes.  Statistical changes include data from 
censuses, such as the economic census or the population census, and other sources of data 
that become available with a long lag or irregularly, such as IRS random audit data.  
Definitional changes include changes in data recognition (such as reclassification of 
government pension contributions as personal income) and changes in concept (such as 
including software as investment or introducing chain-weighted prices). 
  These steady upward shifts have applied to all periods. Let us look at all our data 
points beginning in 1965 Q3, averaged into five-year periods (Table 1). We take vintages 
from the first complete vintage after a benchmark revision.
5  What we see is that of the 26 
changes that these groups underwent in benchmark revisions, 16 were positive and 
greater than 0.5 percentage point.   
                                                 
4 This figure and accompanying data omit the advance estimates that occur just before a benchmark 
revision, which has had no opportunity to change.  We also excluded the last advance estimate, for 2004 
Q4, for the same reason from both this and the next figure.   
5 Complete data back to 1947 is occasionally not available until two or three quarters after a benchmark 
revision. 
  6  Why are revisions biased upward?  Income is harder to measure than expenditure. 
Upward revisions to disposable personal income income have been very large. 
Disposable personal income has been revised as much as 14.8 percent; on average, from 
1965 Q3 to 1999 Q2, the revision has been 8.4 percent (Figure 4).   Over the same period, 
nominal GDP and personal outlays were revised up by less, nominal GDP by 6.5 percent, 
and personal outlays by 5.1 percent.  
  Among the immediately available data, the more complete and reliable data are 
on the demand or product side; this is the source of gross domestic product.  Income side 
data are aggregated to gross domestic income (GDI), conceptually the same as GDP, but 
in practice differing by between 2.3 percent and -1.8 percent; GDP minus GDI is called 
the statistical discrepancy.  Generally speaking, the statistical discrepancy is positive – 
since 1965 Q3 it has averaged of 0.7 percent, with 129 of 158 observations positive – 
suggesting that typically income is undercounted.  The fact that GDP and not GDI is used 
as the primary yardstick expresses the general sense that it is the more reliable of the two 
aggregates. As statistical agencies uncover additional income and product, these revisions 
have been larger on the income side.  
  Over time, changes in the economy make new types of income and expenditures – 
such as stock equity options and Internet sales – more important.  This leads to efforts to 
measure these new activities, raising income and expenditures.  While uncovering new 
expenditures will typically simultaneously reveal new income, sometimes income will be 
revealed without as much expenditure. On net, saving will rise, and rise more for recent 
observations than in the more distant past. Put another way, revisions may be somewhat 
endogenous.  If a part of income has been excluded, and it becomes more important, then 
  7the measured saving rate will appear to be out of kilter, and efforts will likely be made to 
measure the excluded income.  
  To flesh out the benchmark revision proces, we have examined in detail the 6 
benchmark revisions to the 1979 personal saving rate. Over their course, the 1979 
personal saving rate was revised from 4.5 percent to 8.9 percent, a $85 billion increase.    
Here we discuss the two largest revisions that raised the 1979 personal saving rate (a 
more detailed narrative of  the benchmark revisions is provided in Appendix A). 
  In the 1985 revision, the BEA incorporated the findings of a series of random 
audits by the IRS (the Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program) to attempt a full-
scale assessment of undermeasurement resulting from the underground economy. This is 
an example of a statistical revision. Wages and salaries and proprietors’ income were 
increased by $16 billion and $60 billion respectively, and consumption expenditures by 
$30 billion.  The rise in measured consumption came about because some of the 
proprietors whose income was previously uncounted were retailers and service providers, 
so that as their income was counted, so was their output. The net effect was a $46 billion 
increase in personal saving, with disposable income increasing $76 billion.  In this case, 
the uncovering of unmeasured activity revealed much more additional income than 
consumption expenditure. 
  In 1999, the BEA made a definitional change, reclassifying government employee 
retirement contributions as personal income. Retirement funds can be treated as income 
when they are received by the beneficiaries or when they are accrued.  Private retirement 
funds are treated as income when they are accrued, while social security is treated as 
income when it is received.  When the accounts were first set up, government retirement 
  8funds were dominated by the federal government, which did not need to set aside funds 
for retirement programs.  As time passed, state and local employment came to dominate 
government employment, and it then became appropriate to treat government retirement 
programs in parallel with private pension programs.  As contributions were larger than 
benefits, the net result was to raise saving by $30 billion.  In this case, the rise of state 
and local employment led to a reclassification of government expenditure.  
  The appendix also documents two definitional revisions that raised disposable 
personal income and personal outlays without affecting saving.  One was the 1985 
classification of payments to medical vendors as government transfers to households and 
personal consumption expenditures rather than, as previously, government expenditures.  
The other was the 1990 reclassification of payments to government educational and 
medical institutions as personal consumption expenditures rather than as nontax 
payments to government (which are treated like a tax and deducted from disposable 
income).  The effect of these two changes was to raise both disposable personal income 
and personal outlays by $49 billion. 
  Thus far, we have focused on rising levels of the saving rate.  Another question is 
whether the benchmark revisions have tended to wash away differences between advance 
estimates of the saving rate. Consider a regression whose left-hand side variable is a 
given vintage (V) personal saving rate (PSRV) and whose right-hand side variables are 
the original advance estimates of the personal saving rate (PSRadvance) and a constant:   
PSRV= α + β PSRadvance.            ( 1 )  
  If the revision process raised all the PSRs by the same percentage points, then the 
coefficient on the advance PSR, β, would be 1, and the revisions would show up as an 
  9increase in the constant term, α. On the other hand, if the revision process implies that 
initial differences tend to diminish, as they did for 1975 and 1980, we would expect β to 
be less than 1, and for α to be larger than the average increase in the PSR.  In particular, 
the coefficient β is covariance over variance, and tells us how much of the initial variance 
is due to true underlying difference as known at a given later vintage. 
  Mankiw, Runkle, and Shapiro (1984) have argued that equation 1 should have α = 
0 and β = 1 if the preliminary estimate of an economic measure is an optimal forecast of 
the final estimate of that measure.  In this view, a low value of β implies that an economic 
decisionmaker would be better off at the time of the initial announcement using 
additional information  to make an optimal forecast of the final estimate, as otherwise the 
decisionmaker would attribute too much information to the preliminary estimate.  
  We show the results of estimating equation 1 for overlapping 19-year periods in 
Table 2 (we choose 19 years because we can get two complete non-overlapping groups 
into our 39-year sample), taking five-year intervals for our analysis. The most telling 
results are the first series of regressions.  For the period from 1965 Q3 to 1984 Q2, β is 
for all periods significantly different from 1, using a Newey-West robust standard errors.  
By the 1984 Q3 vintage, one quarter of initial differences had disappeared. Over 
successive vintages, the initial differences diminished in importance until they were on 
average only one-third of their initial amounts. Throughout the personal saving rate fails 
the Mankiw et al test.  Moreover, all periods fail the Mankiw et al test after the initial 
vintage.   
 The  β coefficients in our regression equation fall over time as more revisions occur.  
Is this time effect of revisions statistically significant?  Consider a regression that has the 
  10latest vintage saving rates on the left-hand side but allows the constant and the coefficient 
on the advance estimate to change as the amount of time available to revise the data 
increases.  We call this revision time “Rtime” = number of quarters between the advance 
estimate of that observation and the latest vintage.   
  We run the regression PSR2005q1V= a0 + a1 Rtime + (b0 + b1 Rtime) PSRadvance.  
    2005 1 int .168 .076 (.89368 .00731 ) Q V age AE PSR Rtime Rtime PSR =+ + −
             (.616) (.015)            ( .208)    (.00202) 
 
  The standard errors, in parentheses under the coefficients, are Newey-West HAC 
robust standard errors.  The equation shows that the coefficient on the advance estimate 
falls by .029 annually, suggesting that over the roughly 20 years that the median 
observation has been revised, more than half of its initial cross-sectional variation has 
proved to be measurement error.   
  Will the future be like the past? Because the nature of the benchmark revision 
process is highly idiosyncratic, we cannot rely on this.  Our conclusion from this     
regression analysis is that in the past, large differences between personal saving rates 
have proved to be mostly the consequence of measurement error.  It is possible that a 
large part of the current difference between the high saving rates in the early 1980s and 
the current low saving rate will also prove to be the result of measurement error. What is 
clear is that these data are measured with considerable noise, and there is little reason to 
believe that our measures have become more stable than in the past. 
Is the personal saving rate useful in forecasting in real time? 
  We now address the question of whether the personal saving rate is too noisy in 
practice to be useful in forecasting in real time.  If saving rates are low, should we expect 
that future income will rise relative to consumption as saving rates mean-revert?  John 
  11Campbell(1987) has argued that a low saving rate should be a signal of expected future 
growth in labor income. In a bivariate vector autoregression of saving and real labor 
income growth, lags of the saving rate should have a negative sum, according to this 
theory, so that increases in the saving rate forecast declines in real labor income. 
Campbell’s regressions, covering 1953 to 1985, confirmed that high savings rates did 
forecast slower real labor income growth. Campbell’s empirical work was revisited by 
Peter Ireland (1995).  The coefficients on saving had a negative sign as Campbell’s 
hypothesis predicts, and the personal saving rate improved forecasts relative to the 
forecasts of a pure autoregression.  
  We wish to revisit these findings in real-time, to see whether, if forecasters had 
used the personal saving rate to forecast future income growth, their forecasts would have 
improved.  To do this, we estimate our model and make our out-of-sample forecasts using 
real-time data.  To compute forecast errors, we use two tests.  First, we compute forecast 
errors based on real-time data, which is the test a business economist might wish to pass.  
Second, we compute forecast errors based latest available vintage data.  If, as we 
suppose, the latest vintage data has the closer relationship to other economic variables 
(such as unemployment, inflation, or interest rates) then in forecasting these other 
economic variables a decisionmaker might prefer this latter test. 
  Our data is not the same as Ireland’s: we have real-time data on real disposable 
income not real labor income.  Labor income, a constructed variable that excludes 
dividend income, interest income, and the capital share of proprietor’s income, is not a 
variable published as such by BEA.  To check to see whether this substitution creates a 
large difference, we replicate Ireland’s analysis using the same sample period, vintage, 
  12and lag length, substituting disposable personal income for labor income, in Table 3.  
This is to show that the essential features of the estimation are not disturbed by the 
inclusion of some of the capital income measures that Campbell and Ireland have 
excluded..  As Ireland did, we use 6 lags. We find that at forecast horizons of 1, 2 and 4 
quarters that forecast accuracy increases when we forecast real disposable income in the 
VAR but not as much as Ireland’s forecasts of real labor income.
6 At an 8 quarter 
forecast horizon, we do not show forecast improvement.  We take this as evidence that 
disposable personal income is a reasonable but noisier stand-in for labor income.   
  We now proceed to our main forecast comparisons for disposable income in Tables 
4 and 5. We use our entire dataset.  The underlying data used for the estimations go back 
to 1953 Q1, and our first forecast begins with 1970 Q1. The test used is the ratio of the 
root-mean-square error (RMSE) of the out-of-sample bivariate VAR forecast to the 
RMSE of the out-of-sample univariate AR forecast. This is performed forecasting one, 
two, four, and 8 quarters ahead, with tests taken separately at each horizon.  In Table 4, 
we show the regression results using Ireland’s choice of lag lengths, 6 lags.  In Table 5, 
we use the Schwarz criterion, which has good asymptotic properties, to choose the lag 
length.       
  Table 4 shows that if we use Ireland’s choice of lag lengths, with latest vintage data 
(LV), the Campbell hypothesis offers forecast improvement at one and four quarter ahead 
forecast intervals.  Over the entire period, at a one-quarter horizon, the out-of-sample 
forecast for real disposable personal income that uses the latest vintage bivariate vector 
autoregression has a RMSE ratio of .976, suggesting some modest value for the saving 
rate in forecasting.  If we use real-time data, however, this result disappears.  Whether we 
                                                 
6 Ireland gave ratios of MSE, so we have taken square roots. 
  13use latest vintage data as our test of forecast accuracy (RTLV), or real-time data (RT, 
defined a first-published data), the saving rate worsens our forecasts. 
  We also divide up our sample at 1981 Q4, the period at which latest vintage data 
for the personal saving rate begin their long-term decline.  If this long-term decline is an 
artifact of imperfections of our measure of personal saving, then this may be a useful 
breakpoint. We find at a one-quarter horizon there is some value to using the saving rate 
in the first part of the sample, 1970 to 1981, even using real-time data.  However, from 
1982 forward, while the conventional data suggest a (small) value to including the saving 
rate (ratio of RMSE of .97), this completely disappears for real-time data. 
  If we use the Schwarz criterion to choose lag length, even latest vintage data does 
not show the personal saving rate as offering a forecast advantage over the entire period.  
However, over the first 12 years, the Schwarz criterion regressions show similar results to 
the 6 lag length regressions.  In all cases, real time data results in poor forecasting 
performance.  Similar results (not shown) are found when we forecast real GNP/GDP. 
  Let us turn now to whether the data match the theory qualitatively in sample. Real-
time data has negative sum-of-coefficients for the saving rate for most of the history, 
again suggesting that the permanent income hypothesis is correct (Figure 5).  However, 
the sum has become progressively less negative, and has actually been near zero, and 
occasionally positive, since 1998.  This suggests either that the empirical validity of this 
aspect of the permanent income hypothesis has weakened over this period, or that the 
data on saving have become sufficiently noisy that the hypothesis cannot be verified.  For 
forecasting real GNP/GDP we find a similar decline in the negative sum-of-coefficients. 
  14  Consumption. If the personal saving rate is mean-reverting, then a low saving rate 
implies that either consumption must slow or income must rise. Empirically, whether the 
impact is on consumption or income could depend on the relative variability of temporary 
consumption and income. A concern that some policymakers have had is that 
consumption growth will slow as the low saving rate is corrected upward.
7  What we find 
is that there is no empirical evidence for this effect, either in conventional data or the 
real-time data. The four real consumption measures we test are real personal consumption 
expenditures, and the three major components of PCE (durables, nondurables, and 
services). The real measures (in annualized percent changes) are each forecasted with the 
personal saving rate using a bivariate vector autoregression using the SIC to choose lag 
length contrasted with the univariate forecast using the SIC. 
  We find, with all consumption variables, that adding the saving rate to the VARs 
worsens the forecast (Table 6).  The real-time data sum-of-coefficients has been typically 
positive for aggregate real PCE and for durable goods PCE (Figure 6).  This suggests that 
periods when consumers stock up on durable goods are followed by periods when 
durable goods consumption slows.  This is consistent with the volatility of the durable 
goods series.  However, even this effect vanishes beginning around 1998.   
  We have argued that measures of personal saving are subject to substantial 
measurement error.  In the past, large variations in personal saving across time have 
typically been revised away.  The contention that the low personal saving rate implies 
that in the future consumption must rise more slowly than income may be wrong: 
                                                 
7 For example, the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee minutes for September 21, 2004 stated, 
“Members perceived several possible sources of downside risk to household spending.  In particular, 
households might hold back on spending in an attempt to increase their saving, which had fallen to a very 
low level relative to income.” 
  15benchmark revisions might well result in the current low rate being revised upward 
substantially.  Taken together, our results show that one should be careful about drawing 
inferences based upon the latest observations of the U.S. personal saving rate.
  16 
Appendix: 
 
Revision narrative for 1979 disposable personal income and personal saving: 
  1979 disposable personal income was reported as $1624.3 billion (1980 Q4 
vintage) before the first benchmark revision; most recently it was $1793.5 billion (2005 
Q1). Benchmark revisions to disposable personal income increased it by $169.2 billion. 
  1979 personal saving was reported as $73.8 billion in the 1980 Q4 vintage; most 
recently as $159.1 billion in the 2005 Q1 vintage. Benchmark revisions to saving were 
$85.3 billion.  The 1979 personal saving rate rose from 4.5 in the 1980 Q4 vintage to 8.9 
percent in the 2005 Q1 vintage. 
  In the 1980 revision, 1979 disposable income was increased by $17 billion, 
outlays by $5, and saving by $12.  The increase in disposable income was primarily due 
to increases in interest income ($16 billion), based on new statistical information from the 
IRS and the economic censuses, partially offset by an increase in interest payments ($4 
billion) that raised outlays. 
  In the 1985 revision, 1979 disposable income was increased by $88 billion, 
outlays by $56 billion and saving by $32 billion. Three main factors affected the revision. 
First, the BEA incorporated the findings of a series of random audits by the IRS (the 
Taxpayer Compliance Measurement Program) to attempt a full-scale assessment of 
undermeasurement resulting from the underground economy.  Wages and salaries and 
proprietors’ income were increased by $16 billion and $60 billion respectively, and 
consumption expenditures by $30 billion.  Second, expanded measures of costs incurred 
in providing rental housing and new measures of the rents themselves reduced rental 
income by $25 billion.  Third, $24 billion in medicare payments which had been 
considered government expenditures were reclassified as transfer payments and as 
consumption expenditures.  This reclassification was due to recognition that these 
expenditures were increasingly controlled by the medicare patients, in that the medicare 
patients were determining from whom they received the services. This reclassification 
raised disposable income and outlays without affecting saving. 
  In the 1991 revision, 1979 disposable income was increased by $24 billion, 
outlays by $18 billion, and saving by $5 billion.  The largest change was due to a change 
in the treatment of payments to government educational and medical institutions, such as 
tuition payments at state universities.  These had been treated as nontax payments (part of 
tax and nontax payments) to government, with the outlays of the institutions treated as 
government expenditures. They were redefined as consumption expenditures sold by 
government enterprises.  This raised disposable income (since taxes fell) and personal 
consumption expenditures. 
  In the 1995 revision, 1979 disposable income was increased by $23 billion, 
outlays by $10 billion, and saving by $13 billion.  Rental income was increased by $18 
billion, essentially undoing the 1984 revision, as a result of a lowered rate of depreciation 
of rental property.  Consumption expenditures were affected by many factors, but one 
important one was an increase in the proportion of restaurant meals that were considered 
personal rather than business. 
  17  In the 1999 revision,  1979 disposable income was increased by $33 billion, 
outlays by $3 billion, and saving by $30 billion.  The major change was a revision in the 
treatment of government retirement programs, which had been treated like social security 
and were now to be treated like private pension programs.  Social security payments by 
employees and employers are considered to be like an indirect business tax, and excluded 
from personal income. Social security benefits are considered to be transfer payments, 
like welfare and medicare payments, and are included in personal income.  Private 
pension benefits, on the other hand, are considered part of personal income, as if they 
were deposited in the employees’ bank or brokerage accounts.  No income is recorded 
when the benefits are paid out; benefit payments are treated like withdrawals from bank 
or brokerage accounts.  When the federal government accounted for the bulk of 
government retirement programs, it was appropriate to treat these like social security, in 
the sense that the federal government did not have to set aside monies to fund the 
programs.  But when state and local government employment came to surpass federal 
employment it was deemed reasonable to consider them like private pensions.  The net 
effect of the change was to raise personal income by $30 billion, as contributions were 
substantially larger than benefits.  Another factor raising personal income is that the 
interest payments and dividends to government retirement trust funds were added to 
interest and dividend income.   
  In the 2004 revision, disposable income fell by $15 billion, personal outlays fell 
by $8 billion, and saving fell by $7 billion.  Employer contributions to social insurance 
were included in compensation, but also included in the subtracted portion, contributions 
to social insurance, thus having no net impact on personal income.  The major revision 
was a reduction in interest income of $16 billion; this was due to a definitional change in 
the calculation of banking services which was offset by a reduction in PCE of banking 
services.   
  Implications of extrapolation of revision estimates.  Consider, for example, 
nonfarm proprietors’ income. BEA’s fundamental source for this is IRS tax data, which it 
supplements with input-output tables.  Unfortunately, there is a very large discrepancy 
between what is reported to the IRS and the BEA’s best guess of such income.  Adding 
together 2002 IRS adjusted gross income (AGI) for proprietors, estate and trusts, and 
partnerships, BEA arrives at $310 billion (Survey of Current Business, 2004, p.  ).  When 
BEA adjusts its concept of proprietors’ income to the IRS definition, it finds $705 billion.  
What BEA finds is an “AGI gap” of $395 billion.  Of this, $309 billion is due to BEA’s 
estimate of tax misreporting, primarily based on evidence from the 1970s, with the rest 
being unexplained. acts of extrapolation.   
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Appendix Table 1.  Four Major Benchmark Revisions to 1979 personal saving and 
disposable income 
 Revision  to   




1985  $58  $88  $88  Misreporting of taxable income 
$28 Wages and salaries: generally corrections due to 
underreporting of wages and salaries as discovered in the 
taxpayer compliance measurement program of the IRS 
from 1973 to 1979.  (1980 and 1984 revisions) 
$60 Proprietors income, TCMP 
$30 PCE TCMP 
 
 
1985  0  $24   $24 medical vendor payments: medicare reclassified as 
income (transfer payments) and PCE as more choice 
permitted to consumers  (1984 revision) 
1991  0  $25   $25 tax reduced: payments to public educational and 
medical institutions had been considered nontax payments, 
and became considered PCE.  So DPI was revised up 
along with PCE   (1990 revision) 
1999  30  $30  2.  $30 (net) government retirement programs considered 
as income and not transfers as state and local expenditures 
come to outweigh federal (1999 revision) 
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Appendix Table 2.  Benchmark revisions to 1979 U.S. personal income, by category, various 
years  
in billions of dollars 
Benchmark revision date  total   Sources of and disposition of 
personal income  1980 1985 1991 1995 1999 2003 
personal income  19.6 90.2 -0.9 22.7 25.7 -19.3  138
  wages and salary   8.5 16 3.3 0.5 -0.1 0.2  28.4
  other labor income  -4.1 4.1 1.6 0 38.3 -0.2  39.7
  employer contributions to SI*  00000  8 2 . 6  8 2 . 6
 proprietors’  income  0.8 60.3 -10.1 3.2 -1.3 -3.6  49.3
 rental  income  3.6 -24.9 2.8 18.5 -2.6 -0.5 -3.1
 interest  income  17.5 11.9 1.7 0.4 9.9 -16.2  25.2
 dividend  income  -4.1 -0.5 2.3 0.1 6.9 0  4.7
  transfers received by households  -2.6 23.7 -2.4 0 -36.5 1.1  -16.7
  less contributions to SI  -0.1 0.4 0 0 -10.8 82.5  72
 less  taxes  2.1 2.7 -24.5 0 -6.9 -4.6  -31.2
disposable personal income  17.4 87.6 23.7 22.7 32.5 -14.7  169.2
personal outlays  5 55.8 18.3 9.9 2.9 -8  83.9
 personal  consumption  expend  1.1 55.9 16.9 9.8 2.8 -4.1  82.4
 interest  paid  4 . 1 - 0 . 2100  - 8 . 3  - 3 . 4
  transfers to government  00000  4 . 3  4 . 3
  transfers to ROW**  -0.1 0 0.4 0 0.2 0  0.5
personal saving  12.4 31.9 5.2 12.9 29.6 -6.7  85.3
*SI= Social Insurance  **ROW= rest of world 
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Appendix table 3.  1979 Annual Personal Saving: Major sources of revision from 1980 to 
2005 
   1980  2005  Revisions  Major Sources of Revision 
1.Wage & Salary 
Disbursements 
1227.6 1256.0 28.4 statistical (IRS audits, input-
output tables) 
2. Employer contributions 
to social insurance 
82.6 82.6 offset by (9) 
3. Other Labor Income  122.7 162.4 39.7 definitional: govt retirement 
payments  
4. Proprietors Income  130.8 180.1 49.3 statistical 
5. Rental Income  26.9 23.8 -3.1  
6. Interest Income  192.1 217.3 25.2 statistical 
7. Dividends  52.7 57.4 4.7  
8. Transfer payments to 
persons 
252 235.3 -16.7  
9. less Contributions for 
social insurance 
80.7 152.7 72 definitional: offsets (2) 
10. Personal Income  1924.4 2062.2 138.1  
11. less Tax & nontax 
payments 
299.9 268.7 -31.2 definitional: redefine 
payments for public 
education and medicine 
(offset by 14) 
12. Disposable Personal 
Income 
1624.3 1793.5 169.2  
13. Personal Outlays  1550.5 1634.4 83.9  
14. Personal Consumption 
Expenditures 
1509.3 1592.2 82.4 definitional: redefine 
payments for public 
education and medicine 
(offset by 11) 
stat: household expenditure 
at restaurants, etc. 
15. Interest paid  39.6 36.2 -3.4  
16. Transfer payments to 
government 
4.3 4.3  
17. Transfer payments to 
rest of the world 
1.1 1.6 0.5  
18. Personal Saving  73.8 159.1 85.3  
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Table 1.  Personal Saving Rate, 5 Year Averages, After Benchmark Revisions 
(percent) 




76Q1 81Q1 86Q1 93Q1 97Q2 00Q2 04Q1 
65 Q3 to 70 Q2  6.30  6.57  7.21*  7.15  7.20  7.83*  8.55*  8.58 
70 Q3 to 75 Q2  7.32  7.53  8.08*  8.71*  8.40  8.94*  10.09*  10.10 
75 Q3 to 80 Q2  5.59    5.98  7.20*  7.10  7.68*  9.27*  9.14 
80 Q3 to 85 Q2  5.49      6.52  7.98*  8.48*  10.25*  10.37 
85 Q3 to 90 Q2  4.33        4.76  5.67*  7.80*  7.45 
90 Q3 to 95 Q2  4.34          5.14  7.41*  6.32 
95 Q3 to 00 Q2  2.69              3.53 
*More than 0.5 percentage points larger than in the previous benchmark revision. 
Source: BEA, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia Real-Time Data Set for 
Macroeconomists 
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Table 2.  Regression coefficients for: 
Vintage Saving Rate =  Constant + β * Advance Estimate Saving Rate 
(Standard errors in parentheses are Newey-West HAC standard errors, lag truncation=3) 
   Vintage 


















































































    2.30* 
(0.57) 
 AE  coeff      0.764*** 
(0.143) 
*greater than 0, p value < .01 
**less than 1, p value < .01 
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Table 3.  Comparing Ireland’s forecasts of real labor income with our forecasts of real 
disposable income 
Forecasting real disposable income using the saving rate with latest vintage and real-time 
data, using 6 lags  
Data from 1959 Q1 to 1994 Q3 
Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 1994 Q3 
Forecast variable real, quarterly percent changes at annual rates (log difference x 400) 
Forecast period  Forecast horizon 
Forecast period: 










Forecast variable: Real labor income (Ireland, 1995) 
LV .97 .93 .87 .94 
Forecast variable: Real disposable income 
LV  .974 .982 .956 1.065 
RTLV  1.047 1.072 1.094 1.158 
RT  1.050 1.068 1.078 1.113 
 
 
Each entry is the ratio of out-of-sample RMSE of the VAR model (with lags of the 
personal saving rate) to the RMSE of the univariate AR model, 6 lags. 
 
LV indicates that the latest vintage of data (2005Q1) was used to estimate and forecast 
the model and to compute the forecast errors.  RTLV indicates that real-time data were 
used to estimate and forecast the model, but the latest vintage of data was used to 
compute forecast errors.  RT indicates that real-time data were used to estimate and 
forecast the model and to evaluate forecast errors. 
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Table 4. Forecasting real disposable income using the saving rate with latest vintage and 
real-time data, using 6 lags (Ireland) 
Data from 1953Q1 to 2004Q4 
Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 2004 Q4 














Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 2004 Q4 
LV .976  1.001  .965  1.043 
RTLV .996  1.056  1.109  1.167 
RT  1.016 1.077 1.094 1.091 
Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 1981 Q4 
LV  .979 .990 .933 1.005 
RTLV .982  1.047  1.132  1.202 
RT  1.008 1.061 1.080 1.099 
Forecast period: 1982 Q1 to 2004 Q4 
LV .972  1.015  .999  1.076 
RTLV  1.014 1.070 1.079 1.130 
RT  1.026 1.104 1.119 1.081 
 
 
Each entry is the ratio of out-of-sample RMSE of the VAR model (with lags of the 
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Table 5. Forecasting real disposable income using the saving rate with latest vintage and 
real-time data., using SIC to choose lag length 
Data from 1953Q1 to 2004Q4 
Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 2004 Q4 














Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 2004 Q4 
LV  1.011 1.068 1.126 1.304 
RTLV  1.045 1.165 1.292 1.474 
RT  1.061 1.181 1.290 1.407 
Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 1981 Q4 
LV  .957 .964 .938 1.042 
RTLV  1.012 1.095 1.204 1.278 
RT  1.011 1.095 1.167 1.203 
Forecast period: 1982 Q1 to 2004 Q4 
LV  1.068 1.187 1.290 1.510 
RTLV  1.084 1.256 1.383 1.654 
RT  1.123 1.302 1.458 1.638 
 
Each entry is the ratio of out-of-sample RMSE of the VAR model (with lags of the 
personal saving rate) to the RMSE of the univariate AR model, lag length chosen by SIC, 
generally equal to 1. 
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Table 6 Forecasting real output and consumption using the saving rate with latest vintage 
and real-time data., using SIC to choose lag length 
Data from 1953Q1 to 2004Q4 
Forecast period: 1970 Q1 to 2004 Q4 













LV  1.021 1.033 1.063 1.097 
RTLV  1.032 1.066 1.110 1.166 
RT  1.058 1.083 1.114 1.156 
PCE 
LV  1.037 1.065 1.078 1.061 
RTLV  1.033 1.039 1.043 1.059 
RT  1.028 1.042 1.037 1.043 
PCE:Durables 
LV  1.030 1.046 1.066 1.042 
RTLV  1.006 1.011 1.013 1.019 
RT  1.007 1.008 1.004 1.012 
PCE:Nondurables 
LV  1.023 1.036 1.048 1.054 
RTLV  1.029 1.046 1.078 1.105 
RT  1.024 1.047 1.084 1.101 
PCE:Services 
LV  1.004 1.005 1.005 0.995 
RTLV  1.043 1.063 1.079 1.089 
RT  1.038 1.045 1.083 1.071 
 
Each entry is the ratios of out-of-sample RMSE of the VAR model (with lags of the 
personal saving rate) to the RMSE of univariate AR model, lag length chosen by SIC, 
generally equal to 1. 


















































2005Q1 Vintage  Advance Estimates
  29Figure 2
Histogram of Revisions to the Personal Saving Rate
















Mean      =  0.06
Std Dev   =  1.06
MSE        =  1.13
N             =  150
  30Figure 3
Histogram of Revisions to the Personal Saving Rate

















Mean        =  2.44
Std Dev     =  1.95
MSE          =  9.75
N               =  157
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  32Figure 5
Real Disposable Personal Income
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Sample Endpoint  
For Figures 5 and 6, VAR based on real-time data, lag length chosen by the SIC. Figure 6
Real PCE (Total)
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  34Figure 6 (continued)
Real PCE (Nondurables)
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